The resolution of the political and economic crises in Sri Lanka is still a work in progress. The reason is that constitutionally there is no institution remaining that can act as an arbiter. The Rajapaksa clan had subverted the entire constitutional arrangement creating a void.
Currently, a power transition is underway from the Rajapaksa family back to a constitutional order. The 73 year United National Party leader Ranil Wickremesinghe is now Prime Minister, having replaced Mahinda Rajapaksa, ousted after a popular and violent public uprising. He has been supported by almost every party in the 225-member parliament.
However, one member of the Rajapaksa family still lingering in the office is President Mahinda Rajapaksa. To enable him to continue in office, at the very least, his
powers need to be clipped. That is the background to the proposed 21st Constitution Amendment. The 19th amendment was passed in April 2015, when Wickremesinghe was Prime Minister under President Maithripala Sirisena. That amendment had resurrected parliamentary supremacy. The Rajapaksa family, after winning the parliamentary election in 2020 had annulled that by the 20th amendment.
The Rajapaksa plan for centralising power in the President’s hands and installing family members in key appointments has failed. This was caused by a combination of autocratic policymaking and completely unpredictable external factors. The two policy blunders were the cutting of taxes in 2019 and overnight barring the import of chemical fertilisers and pesticides to shift Sri Lanka to organic farming. The already highly indebted state was then hit by the Covid pandemic. Sri Lanka’s tourism industry collapsed, which constituted 5.6% of GDP in 2018. It also hit remittances of workers abroad. The Ukraine war in February 2022 has spiked the price of oil and global inflation, devastating an already damaged Sri Lankan economy.
This perfect storm came after the 2019 Easter bombings had brought Islamic terror to the island. The meltdown is thus a result of multiple internal and external factors. However, the ability to cope with external shocks had been diminished by the Rajapaksa clan’s power grab after basing their politics on nationalism and majoritarianism. Having routed the LTTE in 2009 the family had a choice to make. Take the populist and jingoistic route or seek consensus and accommodation. They chose the former. In addition, they opened the door to heavy Chinese investment in infrastructure at Hambantota, abutting the family's territorial base, and Colombo. The debt-creating splurge eventually caught up with the Rajapaksas.
Constitutionally, Sri Lanka has always hovered between a cabinet or Westminster form of government and the presidential form. It is again trying to balance the power between the offices of the president and the prime minister. The new proposals are suggesting the creation of a National Security Council, chaired by the prime minister. This would shift the foreign policy control to him. There is also a suggested Constitutional Council to approve all appointments. The President's power to dissolve the parliament or dismiss prime ministers would also be removed.
The Sri Lankan dilemma is shared by all liberal democracies globally, as to how an elected leader, or a family as in Sri Lanka, can be kept from usurping all power. To assume that the hard architecture of a system alone can stymie the power grab is too idealistic. For any democracy to function or survive, both, respect for constitutional provisions and observance of unwritten rules are required. The Sri Lankan crisis may enable that nation to tweak the power-sharing arrangement. But it may only last till the next populist captures power.
India is presented with a great opportunity to balance, if not diminish the Chinese intrusion into the geo-economic space in India’s immediate maritime neighbourhood. India has provided financial aid and 65,000 tonnes of chemical fertiliser. Latter should help Sri Lanka get its languishing production of cash crops and rice production back on track. Rebalancing of power between the parliament and the two top offices is desirable for predictable policy formulation. But to imagine that the Rajapaksa family will retire to their estates around Hambantota is unlikely. It is equally unimaginable that China will easily accept a secondary role. But India can use the opening that the crisis has provided to be seen as a responsible and helpful neighbour.
There are multiple lessons from this saga. One, that excessive external debt creation without a repayment methodology is flawed. Two, populist politics mixing religion and nationalism is perilous. That followers of Buddhism, a peace-promoting faith, can espouse militant majoritarianism is inexplicable. This has happened in Myanmar, Thailand, and Sri Lanka.
India’s immediate maritime neighbourhood is crucial for its national security. In Maldives, the Opposition’s chant for the Indian role’s curtailment is concerning. An India, peaceful and tolerant at home can better preach the same message abroad. With the 1991 post-Babri consensus on freezing historical religious wrongs now under challenge, India can lose its moral force. Without that, it cannot be either an arbiter in South Asia or a global voice of reason. The Rajapaksa clan’s political collapse shows the dangers of divisive politics.
(The writer is former secretary, Ministry of External Affairs. He tweets at @ambkcsingh)
