History rarely repeats itself in straight lines; it returns in echoes. In 2009, Sheikh Hasina presided over a political order in which the Bangladesh Nationalist Party found itself cornered, constrained, and eventually excluded from meaningful electoral competition. In 2026, the echo is unmistakable. The BNP, led by Tarique Rahman, son of Khaleda Zia, rises to power while the Awami League remains barred from the contest it once dominated. The actors have changed places; the script of exclusion feels hauntingly familiar. Yet the context is different. Bangladesh is more economically integrated, more demographically youthful, and far more geopolitically consequential than it was 15 years ago. That is why the first test of the new government will be external: how it redefines relations with India without unsettling the hard realities of geography and commerce.
A notable subplot of this election has been the underperformance and visible fragmentation of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and allied hardline platforms that were widely expected to ride the post-Hasina churn. Their tumble has, paradoxically, led some of these groups to question the authenticity of the polls. For India, this outcome is quietly reassuring. In the past year, such elements had amplified anti-India rhetoric in public spaces and were seen as pressing the interim establishment toward positions that complicated regional optics. Their electoral setback reduces the leverage of maximalist narratives and creates more room for a pragmatic reset in Dhaka’s external posture.
Diplomatic Reciprocity and Signals of a New Political Chapter;
In a significant diplomatic signal, Bangladesh’s High Commission in Delhi has resumed full visa services for Indian citizens, three days after Tarique Rahman was sworn in as Prime Minister. Visa operations had been suspended for nearly two months following a sharp downturn in ties after the assassination of anti-India student leader Sharif Usman Hadi in December 2025, which sparked unrest and attacks on sections of the Hindu minority. While business and work visas continued in limited form, medical and tourist categories were halted amid security concerns. Their full restoration now indicates that the Bangladesh Nationalist Party leadership is prioritising stabilisation of relations with New Delhi.
India has moved to reciprocate. Speaking in Sylhet, senior consular official Aniruddha Das said New Delhi is working to restore all visa categories for Bangladeshi nationals, with medical and double-entry visas being prioritised. India had earlier suspended visa services on August 8, 2024, during the July uprising and after former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina left for India, with operations at Visa Application Centres curtailed due to instability. Diplomatic focus has now shifted to Rahman’s prospective visit to India, after Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla attended his swearing-in as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s representative and conveyed an invitation — a gesture seen as an effort to reset ties that had cooled when the previous administration under Muhammad Yunus chose China for its first state visit.
1st. BNP’s historical discomfort with India;
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party has, since its inception under Ziaur Rahman, cultivated a nationalist narrative that often positioned India as an overbearing neighbour. While pragmatic engagement has occurred at different junctures, segments within the BNP’s rank and file have traditionally drawn political mileage from invoking sovereignty concerns, water-sharing disputes and trade asymmetries with New Delhi. During earlier BNP tenures, rhetorical sharpness on issues such as transit, border management and alleged trade imbalances was more pronounced. Although Bangladesh has moderated its tone in recent months, India will remain alert to whether this represents a tactical recalibration or a durable shift in doctrine. The difference between campaign restraint and governing intent will determine the tenor of bilateral ties.
2nd. Potential tilt toward China and Pakistan;
A second area of caution lies in the BNP’s external balancing instincts. China has steadily expanded its infrastructure footprint in Bangladesh through port development, power projects and connectivity corridors under the Belt and Road framework. A BNP government, keen to signal strategic autonomy, may deepen this engagement to diversify leverage against India. Simultaneously, symbolic outreach to Pakistan—despite the heavy historical baggage of 1971—cannot be ruled out, especially in diplomatic or defence exchanges intended to broaden Dhaka’s options. While economic assistance and infrastructure financing from Beijing may appear attractive amid fiscal pressures, overdependence risks debt exposure and geopolitical entanglement. For India, the calculus will be to respect Bangladesh’s sovereign choices while ensuring that connectivity and security architectures in the Bay of Bengal are not strategically diluted.
3rd. Legacy of BNP–Jamaat alignment;
The BNP’s earlier alliance with Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami remains a sensitive variable. During the 2001–2006 BNP-led coalition, Jamaat held cabinet positions, a period critics associate with rising Islamist assertiveness and attacks on minorities. Though the current electoral arithmetic may differ, the ideological overlap between sections of the BNP base and Jamaat sympathisers could shape policy atmospherics, particularly on issues of secularism and minority protection. Even if Jamaat’s parliamentary strength is limited, its grassroots networks and student affiliates possess mobilisational capacity. The challenge for a BNP government will be to demonstrate that coalition compulsions will not override commitments to pluralism or internal security. For India, any perception of extremist resurgence would revive anxieties reminiscent of the early 2000s.
4th. Border security contrasts with the Hasina era;
Under Sheikh Hasina, India-Bangladesh security cooperation reached unprecedented levels. Coordinated operations between border forces curbed insurgent sanctuaries affecting India’s Northeast, and intelligence sharing deepened. Cross-border militancy and organised smuggling networks were significantly constrained through institutional mechanisms. By contrast, during previous BNP administrations, Indian security agencies had expressed concern over insurgent groups allegedly finding refuge across the border. Although circumstances and regional dynamics have evolved since then, the memory of that phase lingers in New Delhi’s strategic community. Sustaining robust coordination between the Border Guard Bangladesh and India’s Border Security Force will therefore be a litmus test of continuity. Stability along the 4,000-kilometre frontier is too critical to become hostage to political recalibration.
5th. Hasina’s contested legacy and domestic polarisation;
Finally, the political narrative surrounding Sheikh Hasina herself shapes the transition climate. Once credited with economic growth and counter-terror consolidation, she now faces criticism from opponents who portray her rule as increasingly authoritarian. Allegations that security forces used excessive force against protesters have sharpened this perception among sections of the public. Supporters, however, argue that strong measures were necessary to preserve order and economic momentum. This polarised appraisal of her tenure complicates reconciliation. If legal proceedings or political rhetoric against her become vengeful rather than procedural, they risk deepening internal fault lines. Conversely, an orderly and transparent accountability process could reinforce democratic norms. For India, which enjoyed close working relations with Hasina’s administration, navigating this domestic churn without appearing partisan will require calibrated diplomacy.
In sum, while the electoral shift in Dhaka opens space for recalibrated engagement, these cautionary strands—historical scepticism toward India, strategic overtures to China and Pakistan, the shadow of Jamaat alliances, border security sensitivities, and the charged debate over Hasina’s legacy—will collectively shape the trajectory of India–Bangladesh relations in the months ahead.
1971’s Shadow: Why Jamaat’s Ideology Alarms India;
The marginal showing of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami carries deeper historical resonance for India. In 1971, its ideological predecessors opposed Bangladesh’s liberation, while auxiliaries such as Al-Badr and Al-Shams aided Pakistani forces in atrocities against Bengali nationalists and minorities. A stronger mandate for such a formation would have revived old security anxieties along India’s eastern frontier and emboldened overt ideological hostility toward New Delhi.
The Chittagong Lesson and the ICT Factor;
Old memories inform present caution. The 2004 Chittagong arms haul—ten truckloads of weapons allegedly destined for insurgent networks—remains a reminder of how extremist ecosystems can exploit political space in Dhaka. India’s support for accountability through the International Crimes Tribunal further entrenched Jamaat’s hostility toward New Delhi.
A Diplomatic Opening for the BNP and Tarique’s Pragmatism;
This electoral setback for Jamaat opens diplomatic room for calibrated engagement with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party leadership under Tarique Rahman. His articulation of a “Bangladesh First” approach suggests pragmatism without perceived subservience. Transit, connectivity, and trade can now be framed as economic decisions serving Bangladeshi interests rather than political concessions to India. For New Delhi, priorities include minority protection, careful handling of the Sheikh Hasina question, and preparation for treaty and trade negotiations approaching 2026.
Yunus Interlude: Moral Authority, Administrative Strain;
In the interregnum after Hasina’s exit, the interim stewardship of Muhammad Yunus carried moral authority but struggled with administrative grip. Expectations of a technocratic reset ran into the realities of a politicized bureaucracy, restive streets, and assertive youth platforms. The economy slowed, law-and-order credibility wavered, and foreign policy signaling appeared inconsistent. For the incoming prime minister, the task is immediate: restore institutional stability, revive economic confidence, and insulate statecraft from street sentiment.
Equal Citizenship, Not Identity Politics;
The victory of two Hindu candidates on tickets of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party has acquired meaning beyond arithmetic. In Muslim-majority constituencies, Nitai Roy Chowdhury and Gayeshwar Chandra Roy framed their mandate not as a minority endorsement but as a vote for equal citizenship. Their message was pointed: Hindus are not guests in Bangladesh; they are citizens with the same constitutional claim to security and dignity as anyone else. With Hindus forming nearly eight percent of the population, their confidence in a BNP-led dispensation signals a shift in political comfort after a turbulent transition period marked by anxiety and contested narratives around communal targeting. The appointment of Nitai Roy Chowdhury as Cultural Affairs Minister — a member of the Hindu minority — carries material political significance. At a time when anti-minority rhetoric and sporadic attacks on Hindus have raised concerns, this inclusion suggests an attempt by the BNP to project moderation and inclusivity for its coming term. It serves as a message both to domestic minorities and to India that the new dispensation is mindful of communal sensitivities and regional perceptions.
Early Signals from the New Prime Minister: A Calculated Outreach to India;
The new Prime Minister’s initial gestures suggest a calibrated effort to stabilise and improve ties with New Delhi. His public emphasis on “balanced diplomacy,” coupled with the reaffirmation of bilateral mechanisms established during the tenure of Sheikh Hasina, indicates that Dhaka is conscious of the strategic and economic weight of India in the region. Rather than dramatic shifts, the signals point to continuity with correction — reassuring India while retaining domestic political space.
Democracy, Rule of Law, and the 1971 Memory;
Both leaders tied minority security to the restoration of democratic process and rule of law rather than to rhetorical assurances. They invoked the legacy of 1971 and acknowledged the role of neighbours in Bangladesh’s liberation, subtly reminding audiences that historical gratitude and present sovereignty can coexist. The emphasis was clear: protecting minorities is not a concession to any external pressure but an obligation rooted in Bangladesh’s founding ideals. Their election from mixed constituencies underscored another point—they were chosen by a broad electorate, not a religious bloc.
Friendship with India, on Terms of Equality;
On relations with India, the tone was cordial yet firm. Both lawmakers spoke of neighbourly ties built on parity rather than dependence, reflecting the BNP’s emerging vocabulary of “friendship with all, equality with neighbours.” The subtext is unmistakable: Dhaka seeks respectful engagement without the optics of alignment. For India, this articulation offers reassurance and a reminder—strong ties will endure best when framed as mutually beneficial partnerships rather than inherited political comfort.
Stability, Minorities, and the Mandate of Confidence;
A striking feature of this election has been the visible turnout of women voters and the quiet support extended by minority communities, including Hindus and Christians, toward Tarique’s party in several constituencies. Protection of minorities—especially Hindus who faced intimidation during political flux—will be an early litmus test. Hasina has rejected the electoral process as unconstitutional and fraudulent, adding to political noise but unlikely to dent legitimacy if stability is restored quickly.
From Comfort to Caution: Reframing the India Equation;
The Hasina years produced strategic comfort between Delhi and Dhaka—security coordination, transit access, intelligence sharing, and infrastructure connectivity were institutionalized. A BNP government is unlikely to dismantle this architecture. What will change is vocabulary: from “special relationship” to “sovereign parity.”
Tarique’s Calibrated Messaging Before the Polls;
Tarique’s emphasis on cordial ties with neighbors reassures investors and foreign partners that policy will be pragmatic rather than ideological.The Undercurrent: Anti-India Sentiment and Rising Extremism;Sections of the public increasingly frame India as overly indulgent toward the previous regime. The challenge is to prevent street sentiment from mutating into state posture.
How New Delhi Should Read the Moment;
India’s response should be swift and respectful. Progress on trade facilitation, water-sharing, and border infrastructure can generate early goodwill while security cooperation continues quietly.
What Bangladesh Gains from Functional Ties;
Smoother logistics, energy trade, and transit access through India lower industrial costs and strengthen export competitiveness while increasing Dhaka’s diplomatic leverage. Economic Dividends for India; Bangladesh remains India’s largest trade partner in South Asia. Connectivity through Bangladesh is crucial for India’s Northeast and regional strategy.
China as the Counterweight;Engagement with China may expand as a balancing strategy in infrastructure financing, though without overt strategic alignment..Pakistan’s Symbolic Overtures;Pakistan may attempt rhetorical outreach to draw Dhaka into subtle posturing. Historical memory remains a restraint, but diplomatic dexterity will be required.A Warmer Reception in Washington;A reform-oriented BNP administration is likely to find a receptive audience in the United States for trade and governance engagement.
Toward a Multipolar Dhaka
The BNP’s ascent ends the era of unquestioned alignment and ushers in a Bangladesh seeking balance, leverage, and visible sovereignty. For India, this means adapting from comfort to competitiveness. For Bangladesh, it means strategic autonomy anchored in stability at home and balance abroad.
(Writer is strategic affairs columnist and senior political analyst based in Shimla)
