The brief communiqué issued in Moscow at the end of the secret, prolonged session of the Communist Summit does not throw any light on the actual outcome of the conference behind shuttered doors during the last three weeks. Representatives of communist parties from 81 nations participated in the conference. It was expected that certain ideological differences of a fundamental nature between Moscow and Peking would be resolved. While the communiqué recognizes the existence of different viewpoints held by different communist parties, it does not say anything about having succeeded in composing them at the Moscow session. The fact that Mr. Liu Shao–Chi, Peking’s top theoretician, made a few formal statements affirming Sino-Soviet solidarity and the solidarity of the Socialist Camp, does not necessarily indicate that ideologically China has fallen in line with Moscow. What is significant is the total blackout of what Mr. Liu Shao-Chi said, if he did say anything, during the course of the secret session. Too much significance cannot be read into the communiqué, which contains nothing to indicate that the Chinese have revised a viewpoint that was roundly condemned by Mr. Khrushchev at Bucharest last June. On the other hand, there is something to show that Peking’s conviction that war between the socialist camp and the “Capitalist” is inevitable remains substantially unchanged. Quite apart from the fact that chairman Mao Tse-tung himself did not go to Moscow to wield the rubberstamp on Mr. Khrushchev’s thesis ruling out the inevitability of war and the need for exporting revolution, one must also take into account the views expounded by organs of public opinion in Peking. Even as talks were going on in Moscow, Peking People’s Daily delivered frontal attacks against “modern revisionism,” and underlined a need to wage a “long term” battle against it. Although in common communist parlance the term “modern revisionism” applies to Yugoslavia’s alleged deviation from Marxist tenets in present context, the term applies to the Soviet Union as well. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the ideological differences between Moscow and Peking continue to be as acute as they were early this year. At best they have probably managed to avert an open showdown which may be attributed to Mr. Liu Shao Chi’s deference to the old adage that discretion is the better part of valour, particularly at a time when Peking is compelled to lean heavily on Moscow for the fulfillment of her industrial targets.
6th December 1960.
