It would be the height of naivete to read too much significance into the result of the French referendum. Apart from establishing the obvious that General de Gaulle has become something of an indispensible father image, the vast number of “yes” votes proves nothing. Indeed, it must mean a lot to the General’s ego which has for some time been subjected to frontal attacks from the extreme rightists and the Communists and has been exposed to the contempt of some important members of the officer corps which brought him back from the relative obscurity of Lorraine. From the General’s point of view the referendum was a great success. More than 80 per cent of the voters in Metropolitan France participated in the referendum and almost 75 per cent of them said “yes” in reply to the General’s question, “Do you or don’t you trust me to solve the Algerian problem in the best possible way for all concerned?” Even in Algeria the response to the referendum was better than expected. Despite their disenchantment with the General, almost 80 per cent of the colons took part in the referendum. Although almost 80 per cent of the Moslems boycotted it the fact that 20 per cent of them cast their votes must give a comforting thought to General de Gaulle. For one thing, this is in contrast, with the unmitigated Moslem hostility he experienced during his recent tour of Algeria. And for another, it helps the General prove that there are among Moslems a section which will not go all the way with the FLN. But viewed from another angle, the referendum and the result of it tell a different story. The success of the referendum in Metropolitan France was unquestionably due to the fear that General de Gaulle might withdraw from politics and leave the field clear for a military take-over if the French people did not give him a carte blanche. The General himself took care to generate this fear in his speech on the eve of the referendum. However, the General cannot lay claim to a similar measure of success for his referendum in Algeria. The 80 per cent of the Europeans and the 20 per cent of the Moslems who participated in the referendum do not constitute more than a third of the population. And the fact that three out of four who voted in Algeria said “yes” does not give the General a clear mandate to solve the Algerian problem in what may seem to him the “best possible way.” It is quite conceivable that in Algeria, those who voted “yes” were influenced by the threat of “internationalisation” of the civil war. But in any case, the fact that the majority of the people who are intimately connected with the “problem” boycotted the referendum is enough proof of the questionable mandate the General may assume to have received. Further, one cannot help regarding this referendum with a certain amount of scepticism for the very good reason that those who voted “yes” themselves do not know exactly how General de Gaulle proposes to solve the Algerian problem. True, the General has often spoken about an “Algerian Algeria” but the definition of it has been varied from time to time, depending on the type of audience the General addressed. Therefore, the precise object of holding this referendum and the nature of the line General de Gaulle may take now must remain conjectural.
10 January, 1961
