Long before conflicts begin, countries often start arguing about rivers, migrants, borders, and memory. That is what is happening now between India and Bangladesh.
Weeks before a new Indian High Commissioner arrives in Dhaka, a politically significant appointment at a delicate moment in bilateral relations, a familiar current has begun to move through Bangladesh’s public discourse.
Islamist leaders, nationalist politicians, retired military voices, and social-media networks have increasingly amplified allegations that Muslims in India, particularly in Assam and West Bengal, are facing persecution after the Bharatiya Janata Party’s sweeping political ascent in eastern India.
Political rhetoric reflects deeper anxieties
On paper, the statements seem routine enough. Shafiqur Rahman, the leader of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, urged India to ensure that no religious or ethnic community is targeted. Nahid Islam of the National Citizen Party warned darkly that alleged persecution of Muslims in Assam could eventually have repercussions inside Bangladesh itself.
But in South Asia, political rhetoric rarely exists in isolation. It gathers around larger anxieties about identity, sovereignty, and power.
And beneath the immediate controversy lies a more consequential shift — the BJP’s rise in West Bengal has fundamentally changed the strategic balance between Delhi, Kolkata, and Dhaka.
For years, Bangladesh’s relationship with India was buffered by the peculiar mechanics of Indian federal politics. New Delhi could not simply dictate terms on sensitive questions, such as river-water sharing, because the government of West Bengal held enormous leverage. Mamata Banerjee repeatedly blocked agreements on the Teesta River, arguing that North Bengal’s farmers could not afford reduced water flows.
However, with the BJP’s electoral breakthrough, Bengal has become a saffron stronghold. Ironically, the new political reality may make compromise even harder. Any BJP government dependent on North Bengal’s political support will hesitate before agreeing to substantial concessions on Teesta waters.
Teesta issue gains geopolitical dimension
This matters enormously to Bangladesh. The Teesta is not simply a river there; it is an emotional and political issue tied to agriculture, ecology, and national dignity. And timing, in diplomacy, is often substance.
Just as India debates water-sharing arrangements, Dhaka has begun openly discussing Chinese involvement in Teesta infrastructure projects near the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow strip of land connecting mainland India to its northeastern states.
To Indian strategists, few places are more sensitive, and the unease in New Delhi is no longer merely diplomatic; it is geopolitical.
Over the past decade, China has become deeply embedded in Bangladesh’s military modernisation.
Chinese submarines, naval systems, aircraft, radars, and drones now form the backbone of much of Bangladesh’s armed capability. Reports that Dhaka may move toward acquiring Chinese J-10C fighter jets have only intensified concerns inside India’s security establishment.
At the same time, Bangladeshi ties with Pakistan appear to be warming after years of relative distance. Pakistani military delegations have visited Dhaka with unusual frequency. A delegation from Jamaat-e-Islami recently met Islamist leaders in Bangladesh. Turkish influence has grown quietly through defence cooperation and soft-power outreach.
Strategic balancing raises concerns in New Delhi
Individually, none of these developments amount to a strategic rupture. Collectively, they suggest that Bangladesh is attempting to widen its geopolitical options and that India is increasingly anxious about where those options may lead.
However, the irony is that Bangladesh itself remains profoundly dependent on India. Its economy relies heavily on access to Indian markets, supplies, transit networks, electricity, and medical infrastructure. Millions of Bangladeshis travel to India every year for treatment, education, tourism, and trade. Geography, stubbornly, refuses to change.
However, geography also creates resentment.
Bangladeshis increasingly view India not merely as a neighbour but also as a giant whose domestic politics inevitably spill across borders. The rhetoric around migration and citizenship in India has deeply unsettled sections of Bangladeshi society, even when official Dhaka avoids direct confrontation.
Conversely, Indians increasingly see illegal migration from Bangladesh not simply as an economic issue but as a demographic and security challenge too. The two political narratives feed each other.
Historical tensions continue to shape perceptions
A peek into past history shows how combustible such narratives can become. In 1964, rumours surrounding the disappearance of a sacred relic from Kashmir triggered anti-Hindu riots across what was then East Pakistan.
The episode had little to do with facts and everything to do with political mobilisation. Religious outrage became a vehicle for nationalist and communal consolidation.
A decade later, river waters became another rallying cry. Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani threatened to lead a march to India’s Farakka Barrage, accusing New Delhi of drying up the Padma River and turning Bangladesh into a desert.
Today, the politics of water is returning once again to haunt Indo-Bangladesh ties. The 30-year Ganges water-sharing treaty expires this December. Officials on both sides insist that negotiations are proceeding normally.
However, climate realities complicate everything. Himalayan glacial flows are becoming increasingly unpredictable. India itself faces rising internal pressure over water security. Absolute guarantees are becoming harder for any government to make.
And yet the emotional symbolism of rivers in Bengal, on both sides of the border, remains immense. That symbolism now intersects with another transformation: the securitisation of India’s eastern frontier.
Border tensions and distrust threaten regional stability
The West Bengal government’s decision to transfer the remaining unfenced border parcels to the Border Security Force has triggered sharp reactions in Dhaka. Bangladesh opposes fencing beyond the agreed boundary framework. India insists that illegal migration, smuggling, and militant movement require tighter controls.
The cumulative effect is unmistakable — the India-Bangladesh relationship is slowly moving away from the optimism of connectivity and regional integration that defined much of the past decade and toward a colder vocabulary of strategic suspicion.
Paradoxically, this may also be the moment when both sides need each other the most.
India cannot afford prolonged instability on its eastern flank while confronting mounting tensions with China elsewhere. Bangladesh cannot realistically decouple itself from India’s economy or geography, no matter how much strategic space it seeks through Beijing.
Both sides realise the real danger is not war or even open hostility. It is the slow normalisation of distrust — the gradual hardening of public opinion on both sides until every river project, border fence, visa dispute, or communal incident becomes evidence of civilisational rivalry.
The author is Editor, United News of India.
