While any breakdown of communication is to be regretted, it might be just as well that the scheduled meeting between the Indian and Pakistani National Security Advisors did not take place. For one thing, the cancellation has exposed an unhappy and unnecessary turf war between the External Affairs Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office. For another, it seems clear now that far from setting the stage for an amicable reconciliation, the meeting, had it taken place, would have degenerated into a slanging match with each side hurling accusations at the other.
The turf war first. The EAM seems to have conveyed the impression that it had nothing to do with the India-Pakistan negotiations and that the PMO, which handled them, bungled things. There is also the ominous suggestion that, possibly because of this turf war, Indian agencies did nothing at all about warnings from United States intelligence regarding an attack by sea on a west coast port in which a five-star hotel would be a target. The charge of inaction in the face of the American warning must be examined and explained. But what also matters is that adversely interested neighbours should not be allowed to exploit domestic bureaucratic rivalry. It is often said in this country that Pakistan’s political establishment is constrained in its dealings with India by the Pakistani military, and especially the Inter-Services Intelligence. Let the Pakistanis not be given the chance of pointing to a not dissimilar dichotomy here.
Apart from anything else it would not be true, for while it is possible that the EAM and PMO styles are different, there is absolutely no divergence of aim and purpose. Both want peace on the western front. Both want justice for the devastation Mumbai suffered when 106 innocent people died because of 26/11. Both want an end to terrorist incursions.
Having said that, I must add that even if the EAM is right and even if its adroit handling of the negotiations had led to the Indo-Pakistani talks being held, it is most unlikely that the outcome would have been positive. The substance of the discussions would have been security, and Ajit Doval would have engaged his opposite number, Sartaj Aziz. The agenda itself spells failure. All the subsequent reports make it clear that Mr Doval would have made a brave attempt to put Mr Aziz in the dock. There is no doubt that he would have had plenty of ammunition for the purpose. He is believed to have compiled a list of 54 Pakistan-based fugitives who are wanted by the law in India. Reportedly, the NSA has also compiled formidable evidence to show that the trial in Pakistan of Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, whom the United Nations Security Council identified as an international terrorist, and six others is little short of a farce. New Delhi uses the word “shoddy” to describe the Pakistan Federal Investigation Agency’s work. Extraordinarily, the FIA seems to have made no effort to extend its inquiries to Hafiz Saeed, Lashkar-e-Taiba’s founder and the principal mastermind of the 26/11 outrage. According to Abu Jundal, an accused who is held in India, Hafiz Saeed visited the LeT control room in Karachi while the now executed Ajmal Kasab was receiving instructions from top commanders.
India also rejects the Pakistani plea of “non-state” actors being responsible for the crime. Major Samir Ali and Major Iqbal are two “state actors” whose names were revealed by David Coleman Headley, the American-Pakistani operative and reconnaissance man for the Mumbai attack, during his trial in the United States, as well as to India’s National Investigation Agency. This was confirmed by Headley’s assistant, Tahawwur Rana. Again, the FIA is accused of ignoring this evidence and thereby allowing the Lahore High Court to grant Lakhvi bail. If the NSA-level talks had taken place, Mr Doval would have asked Pakistan to take all this into account and to submit the voice-samples of Lakhvi as well as Major Samir Ali. It is an added quiver in India’s bow that Tariq Khosa, a former FIA director-general, admits in an article in the Pakistani newspaper Dawn that Pakistan was responsible for planning and carrying out the entire Mumbai operation in 2008. Having admitted all the details, Khosa concluded, “Are we, as a nation, prepared to muster the courage to face uncomfortable truths and combat the demons of militancy that haunt our land?”
There is no denying that all this makes grim reading. But Khosa’s rhetorical question is Pakistan’s internal affair – the extent to which the Pakistani state has succumbed or will succumb to Islamic fundamentalism is in principle an internal matter. But fundamentalism tends to spill over across artificially drawn political borders. If that happens, India cannot remain indifferent to what occurs. However, I am not at all sure that Mumbai 26/11 was an explosion of religious fundamentalism rather than an expression of the persistent animus that accounted for the unprovoked Kutch war or the provocative intrusion at Kargil. India must address the challenge of secular hostility even more than of religious enmity. The available evidence indicates that Lakhvi is entirely controlled by the ISI. No wonder the Pakistanis have taken no notice of India’s complaint to the United Nations about Lakhvi being released on bail of five lakh Pakistani rupees. The bail amount is significant for Lakhvi who is a proclaimed offender, the LeT is a proscribed organisation linked to Al Qaeda, and the UN could indict the government of Pakistan if it were found to have provided the money.
Mr Doval may have reiterated much of this if the NSAs had met. But to what purpose? Mr Aziz would not have listened in shamefaced silence. Second, there is no reason to suppose that anything India said would have made the Pakistani government and people feel guilty. Mr Aziz has let it be known that if the talks had taken place, he would have produced a file on the alleged activities of India’s Research and Analysis Wing in Baluchistan. No doubt there would have been other accusations as well. It costs nothing to level a charge.
The charge may be fictitious and far-fetched but seldom fails to have the desired emotive impact. Let us not forget that if Indians are contemptuous of everything that emanates from Islamabad, Pakistanis are equally disdainful of whatever New Delhi might say.
Their attitude was long ago expressed by a Pakistani high commissioner in New Delhi who, having denied every charge levelled in the Indian White Paper on Pakistani mischief during the Khalistan rebellion, added, “And even if it were true, can you blame us after Bangladesh?” Kashmir rankles just as much. Bangladesh can now look after itself, but if Kashmir is not on the bilateral agenda, then there is nothing to discuss and the acrimony will continue no matter what India says and does.
