During his decade-long tenure as prime minister, Manmohan Singh told the country that the “greatest internal security threat” to it was from the leftist extremists that called themselves Maoists or Naxalites. More recently, a diligent columnist quoted official statistics showing that in each of the five years since 2008, the largest number of Indians killed in organised political violence were victims of Maoists. Those killed by terrorists numbered much less. Yet, sadly, those responsible for Indian security haven’t paid enough attention to the Maoist menace.
Otherwise, the Maoist rebels would not have killed more security force personnel than the other way round. Even the people at large seem indifferent to this festering problem, except when some horrendous Maoist outrage takes place. Four such havocs have been perpetrated in Chhattisgarh in over just three days. In all these, including the one in which the Special Task Force of the Chhattisgarh Police had initiated the operation to nab a notoriously dangerous Maoist leader, named Hidma, the security forces were at the receiving end. All that happened needs to be analysed thoroughly, if only to learn the necessary lessons.
It was in the early morning of Saturday, April 11, that the depressing and doleful story began. A team of the specially trained policemen embarked on a campaign to arrest Hidma, who is most wanted and was known to be in the region of the Sukma district. The glaring mistake of the planners of the mission was to deploy only 49 STF members on such a difficult duty. For, anyone who knows anything about Chhattisgarh is aware that Hidma travels with no fewer than a hundred comrades. In any case, before the special team could do anything, it was ambushed by the Maoists near a village named Pilmed as early as 9 am. Seven security personnel, including the platoon commander, were killed. The STF team had no option but to retreat.
However, the Maoists did not allow them to carry the bodies of their commander and colleagues. Understandably, the retreating platoon sent an SOS to the nearest police station, which was only 10 km away. For reasons unknown, reinforcements that included 300 heavily-armed men of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) arrived only on Sunday morning. They had the mortification of having to wait for several hours before the Maoists relented and allowed them to carry back their dead. An inquiry into this tragic episode will surely be held. But it is already clear that the STF of the Chhattisgarh hadn’t informed the CRPF, which is the central agency responsible for combating the Maoists in cooperation with the states. On Sunday, the Maoists had an exchange of fire with the security forces, in which a Border Security Force jawan was killed in Kanker district. Almost simultaneously, they also set ablaze 18 vehicles that were engaged in mining work in the same area. The Maoists certainly don’t want any development because that would reduce their following. Luckily, no one was killed.
In contrast, the fourth Maoist outrage in three days was far more destructive. At Dantewada, a major base of security forces that has been attacked in the past as well, the Maoists demonstrated their prowess and skill by killing five policemen who were sitting, along with some others in an anti-landmine vehicle.
The Maoist rebels blew it up with the help of a very powerful improvised explosive device (IED) packed with 50 kg of explosives. The impact tossed the vehicle into air. Thereafter, the perpetrators of this crime fired indiscriminately. The distance between Dantewada and Kanker is 200 km. Yet the same Red brigade is said to be the instrument of carnage in both places.
According to official sources in Raipur, Maoists often register their presence and power by such a series of violent attacks in order to attract new recruits. Often they are also able to display to the people the lack of competence and poor planning of the security forces and the government. This has been particularly the case this time around.
I am afraid these lethal deficiencies on the part of the Indian state are not occasional but more or less permanent. Over the last decade, every single internal security expert, including those who have run the CRPF, BSF and other central agencies, has regretfully pointed out that the central and state entities charged with the task of fighting the Maoists are “neither properly trained, nor properly led, nor properly equipped.” No wonder, their performance continues to be appallingly poor.
During the three-day orgy of violence in Chhattisgarh, the leadership of the Central government did meet in Delhi. In the absence of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh presided. However, no worthwhile policy statement emerged from the gathering. Luckily, the state government in Chhattisgarh and the government in New Delhi both belong to the BJP. It should be easy therefore for them to hammer out a strategy against the Maoists that produces results.
Things were different when the Congress-led UPA was in power at the Centre and the BJP ruled Chhattisgarh. It is no surprise, therefore, that this time around too the state Congress has blamed the BJP for having learnt nothing from its past mistakes.
However, blame games will get us nowhere. What needs to be done is to have an all-party meeting to devise a really effective structure – a seamless combination of the central and state agencies, headed by the Army, which should be in charge of training – that would get things done.
