Modi has really pushed hard to strengthen the strategic relationship with the US in particular and the West in general. He is probably the most pro-West PM India has had, and he isn’t so because he is enamoured of the West but more because he seems convinced that a close and cooperative economic and security relationship with the West is critical for India’s rise.
Two years into Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government is a good enough time to do some stock-taking about the performance and direction of foreign policy. A number of adjectives can be used to describe how his government has handled external affairs of India – dynamism, new energy, highly charged, high profile,out-of-the-box, bold, innovative, personalised etc. And while these adjectives do apply to Mr Modi’s style of diplomacy, in terms of actual accomplishments, its been something of a mixed bag. This is partly so because changing the dynamics of international diplomacy requires much more than two years. But it is also because in international relations, many known and unknown variables can play the spoiler in the most carefully calculated policy initiatives. And then there is the whole issue of India’s slothful, obstructive and rent-seeking domestic political and bureaucratic system that interferes in efforts to translate the promise of foreign policy initiatives into performance on ground. While Mr Modi has tried to shake up the domestic system and introduce reforms, he has found limited success, which in turn has given his detractors the opportunity to not only question as to what he has to show for all his diplomatic endeavours, but also take pot-shots(one daresay, somewhat unfairly) on some of the diplomatic initiatives in the immediate neighbourhood that went awry.
In India’s South Asian backyard, relations with Bhutan have been steady. With Bangladesh there has been an upturn in relations what with the Modi government signing the historic land-boundary agreement and settling the enclaves issue. Ironically, in opposition the BJP had opposed this agreement which had been finalised by the UPA government. But while the UPA balked at finishing what they started, Mr Modi did the wise thing to seal the deal and take the credit for it. India’s backing for the Hasina government in its fight against Islamist terrorists, deepening economic cooperation with Bangladesh and promising to solve the Teesta waters issue have all contributed to strengthening the relationship. With Sri Lanka too, things are looking up. The new Lankan government is more receptive to India’s concerns and in turn India has reciprocated by addressing some of the Island nation’s concerns.
With Nepal, its been a roller coaster ride. Mr Modi ended the neglect of Nepal by becoming the first Indian PM to visit that country in 17 years. India also pulled out all stops in rescue, relief and rehabilitation efforts after the devastating earthquake. A number of economic and political initiatives were taken to give heft to the special relationship that Nepal shares with India. And then it all went to dust, not so much because of anything that Mr Modi’s government did, but more because of the perfidy of the Nepalese PM who reneged on his assurances to India on the new constitution of Nepal. Where the Indian government has to be blamed is that it didn’t keep its eye on the ball on the constitution making process in Nepal and by the time it realised that it had been short-changed it was too late. Not responding to KP Oli’s perfidy wasn’t an option for India because the new constitution of Nepal which discriminated against the Madhesis had serious implications for India’s own security. Tightening the screws on Oli was in the order of things. Oli’s bluster of getting China to replace India’s centrality in Nepal was an empty threat by a person who obviously neither understood the tyranny of geography or the importance of cultural and other links that bind Nepal to India. But after playing hard-ball, India made its second mistake by not following through its tough line until it achieved what it wanted and lifted the pressure merely on the basis of insincere assurances.
On China, Mr Modi has tried to make a breakthrough using a combination of personalised diplomacy with the Chinese president, leveraging economic interests and counter-balancing China by reaching out to other countries on China’s rim and also not holding back in registering its claims on issues like Pakistan-occupied Kashmir or, for that matter, building border infrastructure in places like Arunachal Pradesh to not only beef up India’s defences but also emphatically re-assert its claims on the territory.At the same time, Mr Modi has also been bold enough to push for a settlement of the vexed boundary issue. But so far, it has been mixed result. Incidents of border incursions, routine before Mr Modi, have reduced drastically. The economic relationship with China has remained robust. But the fly in the ointment – Pakistan – remains a stumbling block in improving relations with China. The Chinese veto on designating the Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar as an international terrorist, its blockage of India’s entry into the NSG, its use of PoK territory to build the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, its sale of submarines and other advanced weapon systems to Pakistan prevent the chasm of trust and confidence from being bridged and forces India to counter-balance China by entering into a closer strategic partnership with the US.
Pakistan is yet another area in which Mr Modi’s foreign policy seems inconsistent and even confused. On the face of it, Mr Modi’s approach to Pakistan is no different from that of his predecessors and is characterised by the blow-hot, blow-cold, flip-flops and one step forward two steps back sort of policy that is high on showmanship and low on substance. But this is only one track of the policy. There is also a parallel track which isn’t directly aimed at Pakistan but which eventually could end up constricting Pakistan’s strategic space and isolate it in the region and beyond. Mr Modi’s forays into places like UAE and Saudi Arabia and the efforts to push India’s relations with the Arab states to a new level will clearly impact on Pakistan which has traditionally had very close relations with these countries. Until now, at the political level India left the field open for Pakistan in this part of the world. Now, however, a conscious effort is being made to deny this space to Pakistan. Under Mr Modi, India has been quick to exploit the breaches in Pakistan’s relationship with these countries on account of the Yemen war. At the same time, by going into an overdrive on the Chahbahar port, and signing the trilateral agreement with Iran and Afghanistan, Mr Modi has pretty much moved to not just isolate Pakistan but also encircle it in the region. On balance, therefore, the desultory track of engagement serves to disarm whatever pressure there is to reach out to Pakistan while the strategic track aims to change the regional dynamics in a way that it emasculates Pakistan.
Beyond the region, Mr Modi has really pushed hard to strengthen the strategic relationship with the US in particular and the West in general. He is probably the most pro-West PM India has had, and he isn’t so because he is enamoured of the West but more because he seems convinced that a close and cooperative economic and security relationship with the West is critical for India’s rise. With the US, he has tried to break the logjam on a range of issues ranging from the nuclear liability law to the signing of some of the foundational defence agreements and making substantial headway in not just defence purchases but also in the pathfinder projects as well as joint development and manufacturing of defence equipment. On the economic side, he has managed to revive the Western interest in the India story, which was all but over in the last couple of years of the Manmohan Singh government. The Make in India program seeks to make India the manufacturing hub and has evinced a lot of interest.
At the end of the day, however, foreign policy cannot be divorced from domestic realities, and the latter in many waysis proving to be a far more onerous challenge for Mr Modi than striding on the world stage and making deals that push forward India’s interests. Purely judging Mr Modi’s foreign policy, 6/10 would probably be a fair assessment after two years in office. If he had got Nepal and China right, it would have been 8/10. As for Pakistan, it’s a lost cause anyway and a waste of time, and if Mr Modi doesn’t get any marks, he also doesn’t lose any marks.
The author is Senior Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation
