A day after the results of the Haryana Legislative Assembly elections were declared on Tuesday, several leaders who lost by narrow margins were left wondering what went wrong and how. Out of 90 constituencies, in 19 seats, the margin of victory was less than 5,000 votes. Of these, 11 seats saw margins of defeat under 2,500 votes, with three constituencies determined by fewer than 1,000 votes deciding the fates of the victor and the vanquished. Notably, the Congress party, which continues to refuse to accept its defeat by blaming the establishment for manipulating the EVMs, holds the distinction of witnessing both the highest margin of victory and the lowest margin of defeat.
Former CM Bhupinder Singh Hooda won his Garhi Sampla Kiloi seat by a substantial margin of 71,465 votes, while his distant relative Brijendra Singh, son of popular Jat leader Chaudhary Birender Singh, lost the Uchana Kalan seat by a wafer-thin margin of 32 votes to BJP nominee Devender Attri. While smaller margins between victory and defeat are common in states with smaller populations, the exceptionally high number of seats witnessing close contests in a mid-size state like Haryana has baffled many.
For the record, out of 17 seats where the margin between defeat and victory was less than 2,500 votes, the BJP won eight, Congress seven, and the erstwhile ruling Indian National Lok Dal (INLD) two. This might give the impression that Lady Luck played tricks on both major parties. The Congress, however, feels it was more than luck, claiming they were thwarted by the manipulation of EVMs. If all low-margin seats had gone in their favour, the Congress tally would have reached 45—the halfway mark—while the BJP's numbers would have dropped to 40 instead of the 48 it won.
Barring those who routinely find fault with the EVMs and the autonomous Election Commission of India after unfavorable results, none support the Congress's claims. While the Congress is once again left crying foul after snatching defeat from the jaws of certain victories, BJP cadres are patting themselves on the back for implementing exceptional multifaceted local strategies that the Congress failed to grasp. These strategies included allowing Congress to lull itself into feeling complacent, believing a landslide victory was assured.
The BJP's machinery had become extremely active as soon as the June Lok Sabha polls showed them tied with the Congress, each winning five seats in the state. To start, the BJP sought greater involvement from its parent organisation, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which did not disappoint. To its credit, the RSS has units and flag bearers in every village of the state.
The first part of the strategy was to highlight the Jat versus non-Jat factor. Since the Congress made it clear that either Hooda or his parliamentarian son, Deepender Singh Hooda, would be the new chief minister, non-Jat leaders and cadres within the Congress felt disenchanted. This Jat versus non-Jat divide enabled the BJP to polarise and consolidate its vote bank, particularly among Punjabis and OBCs. The second part of the BJP-RSS strategy was to encourage and financially support many disgruntled Congress leaders to enter the fray as independents after their claims were overlooked. This tactic proved especially effective in the Jat-dominated regions. Jat candidates divided their own votes, helping many of the BJP's non-Jat nominees to secure victory. This is one of the primary reasons the BJP performed exceptionally well in the Jat-dominated seats this time. RSS workers utilised special mobile apps to track voting. They had data on their committed voters from the past decade. A message would be sent to the booth in-charge if some voters did not show up during the first half of the day. They promptly mobilised those voters to ensure they cast their ballots, resulting in a higher voting percentage towards the closing hours on polling day, October 5.
Interestingly, many close contests and lower margins between victory and defeat arose because elections in several constituencies were not contested in the name of the party or its top leaders. Close contests occurred in seats where two or more formidable candidates faced off against each other. The BJP encouraged this dynamic, while the Congress was oblivious to how the assembly election had devolved into panchayat-level polls, where local issues and personal connections held more sway than party affiliation or the identity of the potential chief minister.
BJP's micro-level voter and booth management helped it snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, leaving the Congress fuming and fretting. This model may be replicated in other upcoming poll-bound states, particularly in Maharashtra, where the BJP-RSS has a strong base. Its success in Maharashtra could eventually change how elections are contested in the future, potentially extending even to Lok Sabha elections.