CONFLICT

US INSINUATIONS OF ALIKELY SINO- INDIAN "LIMITED CONFLICT" RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT INDIA'S STRATEGIC PREPAREDNESS, WRITES N. V. SUBRAMANIAN. LIMITED WAR?

1 February 2012: By his statement that India is preparing for a " limited conflict" with China, the director of US national intelligence, James Clapper, has set the proverbial cat among the pigeons. " The Indian Army," said Clapper to the Senate select committee on intelligence, " believes a major Sino- Indian conflict is not imminent, but the Indian military is strengthening its forces in preparation to fight a limited conflict along the disputed border, and is working to balance Chinese power projection in the Indian Ocean." As statements go, this is fairly accurate, although the timing, and an US intelligence chief saying it, renders it suspect.

India is making preparations for a potential conflict with China, but a two- front war with China and Pakistan together is also on logic would suggest a Sino- Indian conflict would be " limited" ( both are nuclear powers, drivers of the worlds economy, and long wars between states in this over- connected globe is inconceivable), there is no guarantee it will be so.

India won't provoke or commence the conflict. But equally, it won't permit a repeat of 1962, when China terminated the war when its object " to teach India a lesson" was fulfilled.

Yet, factual as it may seem, the timing of Clappers statement raises more questions than brings answers. The US is not a neutral player on the India- China issue. Certainly, on the border dispute, the United States has not taken a position, or taken an earlier stand detrimental to Indian interests, especially in regard to Arunachal Pradesh. China is opposed to third- party mediation on the border dispute, and since that satisfies Indias own position on the Kashmir issue with Pakistan, it has gone along.

But the United States under president Pacific power, with huge stakes in the Asia- Pacific region, where it supports Chinas neighbours in their South China Sea dispute against the totalitarian behemoth.

Since India has become active in that region to counter a growing Chinese military role in Pakistan- occupied Kashmir, the United States sees this country as a manner of co- partner against Chinese expansionism.

Governments often make statements to test the waters. Clappers deposition before a US Senate committee could be categorized as such. When the Indo- US nuclear deal was in the works, there was diplomatic buzz about secret annexures that spelt out its anti- China orientation. It was far from being so. But China implicitly believed it ( egged on by sections in the US) and turned hostile to the deal. In its hostility, it provoked Pakistan to demand a similar deal from the United States, and when it was denied, it boldly stepped into the breach.

In other words, the US could have a hidden agenda in making such a statement now, and the Chinese would construe it so.

It may be that in its twilight hour in Afghanistan, the United States is forcing a in its multi- nation campaign against China in the South China Sea, but India won't be hurried. The harder anyone presses India to become an ally, the stronger its nonaligned impulses grow to resist it, and that is what will happen with Clappers statement.

Not only will India deny the thrust of the statement quickly, it would go out of the way to appear friendly to China in new ways, while doing all that Clapper says it is doing. India will not be dictated to in its strategic policies, least of all vis- a- vis China, its greatest adversary.

But substantially, Clapper has got it right, although the bets are off if China will repeat a " limited war", 1962- like, in the eastern and other disputed sectors. This writers reasoning, as published before, is different. China may wish to inflict a " greater order of punishment" on India most likely in the Indian Ocean. While the Indo- Tibet border may suit Chinese hostilities against India to end the new uprising in Tibet ( a Chinese victory being calculated to produce a setback for Tibetan nationalism), an Indian Ocean skirmish with India would greatly advance Chinas strategic goals. Whether India is aware of all these planning is services- oriented, hardwarecentric, and does not flow out of a strategic vision. For example, deriving from whats written above, it would appear that a war in the 1962 territories would become very imminent if the Tibetan Buddhist uprising goes out of hand.

A local war with a calculation of Indian defeat would greatly appeal to the Chinese political leadership as a way to tell the Tibetans not to bank on Indian support. An Indian Ocean skirmish, however, would have to meet the larger strategic goals of China.

James Clappers Senate deposition, while provoking the routine denial or " no comments" from India, should nevertheless become the starting point for in- depth analysis of potential Sino- Indian conflict scenarios. Whilst the Indian military presumably does such exercises, that should not prevent the independent strategic community from weighing in with its objective analysis. It is a life- and- death matter for India.

N. V. Subramanian is Editor, www. NewsInsight.

net, and writes internationally on strategic affairs.

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