Raksha Mantri (RM) Manohar Parrikar has developed an inimitable knack for questioning in a very matter-of-fact sort of way long-held beliefs on some of the most sensitive security issues that have almost acquired the status of being immutable. During a recent book launch, the RM once again provoked a much needed debate when he questioned the utility of sticking to the No First Use (NFU) policy as one of the pillars of India’s nuclear doctrine. While the usual suspects among the commentariat slammed Mr Parrikar for what they said was loose talk, the fact is that the RM chose an appropriate forum – the audience comprised of top experts and analysts of India’s defence and security policy – to express his own opinion on the issue, which he made clear was at variance with the official policy of the government which remained committed to the NFU.
For some strange reason the nuclear doctrine that was first enunciated more than a decade ago has been treated as something that is carved in stone and is therefore inalterable. Every time someone tries to initiate a debate on the issue, there is such a storm of protest unleashed that the debate remains still-born. The BJP election manifesto in 2014 had spoken about the need to “revise and update India’s nuclear doctrine”. But soon after the manifesto was released, the BJP appeared constrained to play down the issue of reviewing and updating the nuclear doctrine lest it spooks rest of the world. Even at that time, the entire focus was on NFU in spite of the fact that NFU is only a part and not the sum and substance of the nuclear doctrine.
That security doctrines, including those dealing with nuclear policy, need to be periodically reviewed is a no-brainer. Doctrines are constructed on the basis of certain ground realities which keep changing. Unless a doctrine is able to factor in the constantly changing strategic environment and factor in the new strategic realities, which include new alignments, challenges and security concerns and imperatives, the doctrine is not worth nothing to no one. In the years since the nuclear doctrine was enunciated there has been a sea change in the complexity of the strategic environment and nature and scale of challenges confronting India. Many of the assumptions and conditions under which the original doctrine was framed no longer stand true.
At the turn of the century, India’s conventional capability gave it a very high nuclear threshold. The assumption at that point was that if there are hostilities between India and Pakistan, it will only be India that will enter and capture Pakistani territory and that the converse was not a realistic possibility. In the case of China, it was assumed that India had enough capabilities to prevent any Chinese breakthrough. But since that time, the scandalous neglect of military modernisation has pared down some of the conventional capabilities. Add to this the growing Sino-Pak nexus, which confronts India with a serious possibility of a two-front war. Even if a second front isn’t opened in the event of hostilities between India and Pakistan, there is no way India can pull out its forces from the Eastern front to meet the challenge on the Western front (the same dynamic will apply in the event of any conflict in the east with China). In other words, India’s conventional superiority against even Pakistan is not quite what macro numbers would otherwise suggest.
This means that India must prepare for worst-case scenarios in which the old assumptions no longer hold true. No government in India can conscionably hold on to NFU as gospel or, for that matter, as some kind of a Holy edict which is inviolable even when its security is imperilled. There is therefore a need for clear red-lines, which if breached, will make NFU redundant. In a way, the RM hinted as much when he said (and this part of his remarks has been ignored in the general cacophony focusing on the NFU) that “a written defence strategy doesn’t mean you have to follow it…if there is some danger to the country I will not open the book first”. This remark is really the nub of the ‘unpredictability’ in India’s posture that the RM has been advocating, so much so that even if no review of the nuclear doctrine takes place and the government decides to stick to the old nuclear doctrine, the RM has injected the virus of unpredictability that will keep India’s enemies second guessing on what India will do if it is pushed into a corner.
As things stand, the old doctrine has its positives and negatives. On the positive side, it projected India as a responsible nuclear weapons state which brought dividends in the form of the civil nuclear deal and holds the prospect of India’s entry into the NSG. Another positive of the old doctrine is that it makes command and control relatively simple when compared to a First Use policy. On the negative side, it has allowed Pakistan to indulge in nuclear blackmail. By leveraging deliberately cultivated irrationality which is reflected in its constant nuclear sabre-rattling, Pakistan has degraded India’s nuclear deterrent to a point where it is neither quite credible nor is it deterring the adversary. By convincing India that it is irrational enough to actually use nuclear weapons in a conflict, Pakistan has successfully forced India to refrain from taking any coercive military action to punish it for sponsoring terrorism in India.
Ultimately, the debate about NFU versus First Use is irrelevant because the issue isn’t so much about whether or not to stick to the NFU posture; it is about making the deterrence credible and effective. Although some strategic thinkers believe that changing the nuclear doctrine will lead to strategic instability and uncertainty and is best avoided, the counter argument is that the current Indian posture has introduced a sort of strategic stability which works to Pakistan’s advantage. An element of uncertainty and ambiguity therefore needs to be introduced to keep adversaries unsettled.
Be that as it may, debating and reviewing the nuclear doctrine doesn’t necessarily mean a total change or complete overhaul. It is entirely possible that after such a review, the government may reach the conclusion that the doctrine as it exists doesn’t need to be tweaked, revised or updated. But such a conclusion should be the result of serious deliberations and not just a blind adherence to a doctrine that was framed in a different era.
Author is Senior Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation. Views expressed are personal.
